Speaking on my own behalf, rather than on Locke or Jefferson's: Obviously I don't think that we are "endowed by our Creator" with anything. I'm also not sure that I accept
rights as having any intrinsic moral existence: to the extent that I do see rights as philosophically useful, I think I would see them as rules of thumb within an underlying consequentialist framework.
So, where the
Declaration speaks of rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, I would say that in general a person should be free to live his life as he chooses, because he is likely to be the party with the strongest interest in how he lives it.
The same goes for property rights, which Jefferson left out: I don't think that the deed to a property comes with divine approval. Rather, if you live on a piece of land, build on it, plant crops on it, it generally makes sense for you to make the decisions about how the land can be used, because you will be the person most affected by those decisions.
But when your decisions involve significant externalities--if you decide to pursue your happiness by beating people up, for instance--the language of rights becomes less useful. It's possible to deal with those cases by constructing a system in which limited rights are weighed against each other (your right to swing your fist, the other man's right to keep his nose intact, perhaps a right of the electorate to institute punishments for assault), but it seems simpler (and truer?) to deal with them in terms of interests, instead.
Ggeezz comes to similar practical conclusions, but gets there (as I tentatively understand him) through a two-level system, in which rights have intrinsic force, but can be overridden by sufficiently compelling consequentialist concerns:
ggeezz wrote:(IMO) this endeavor of protecting the life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness of all is so important that we grant government the authority to infringe rights in order to perform this duty.
It makes more sense to me to make it consequentialism all the way down.